Introduction
An important aspect of science is the construction of models and theories. Philosophy of science aims to elucidate this practice by asking various questions, such as: "What is a theory?" "What is a model" "How do models and theories relate to one another?" "How do models and theories relate to the world?" The so-called syntactic view of theories, which originated in the tradition of logical empiricism and logical positivism in the 1920s, construes scientific theories as axiomatized logical calculi whose nonlogical terms are interpreted in terms of observables. This view came under criticism after World War II and was eventually supplanted with the so-called semantic view of theories. According to that view, theories are sets of models, where models are construed as nonlinguistic entities that relate to reality via either a set-theoretical mapping (such as isomorphism) or similarity. A common denominator of both views is that they see models as subordinate to theories. The syntactic view sees models as alternative interpretations of a calculus, which is primarily of pedagogical interest. The semantic view sees them as being the building blocks of theories. In parallel to these schools of thought, there was always a strand of research focusing on the practice of science, on case studies and the methods in specific scientific disciplines, rather than on overarching philosophical concerns. Heterogeneous in character and orientation, what binds projects in this tradition together is the belief that large parts of science are not in the business of devising exact and all-encompassing theories but rather use a variety of different techniques and ingredients to construct models that are locally adequate. Models are now seen as the center of scientific attention and theories are relegated to 5 Carnap's paper applying Hilbert's epsilon operator to theoretical terms. Lewis 1970 offers an analysis along the same lines, but Lewis's approach differs from Carnap's in some essential respects.
Braithwaite, Richard. Scientific Explanation. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press,
1953.
Chapter 3 of Braithwaite's book is one of the first extended discussions of the application the Ramsey sentence to the issue of the meaning of theoretical terms. This paper provides an in-depth discussion of the various problems that empiricism faces and formulates the thesis of meaning holism, the view that the meaning of observation sentences is determined by the theories with which they are connected.
Hanson, Norwood R. Patterns of Discovery. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1958.
Hanson gives a forceful statement of the claim that all observation is theory laden: there is no such thing as the "immaculate perception," and a certain theoretical framework is presupposed in every observation, no matter how elementary. 
The Semantic View of Theories
The syntactic view of theories was superseded by the so-called semantic view of theories. The view crystalized in the early 1960s in Stanford in the work of Suppes (conveniently collected in Suppes 2002, cited under *Mainstream Core Texts*). In the 1970s the movement effectively split into two factions. On the one hand, there is what one could call the mainstream, the versions of the semantic view that developed as a part of a majority Anglo-American philosophy of science (although it should be emphasized that Brazilian philosophers made a notable contribution to this tradition). On the other hand, there is what has become known as "Munich structuralism" (often referred to simply as "structuralism" by its proponents; the qualification "Munich" is owned to the fact that Munich has been the epicenter of the movement for a long time). This version of the semantic view has been developed predominantly by philosophers working in German-and Spanish-speaking countries. The reasons for this schism are hard to trace and, with hindsight, difficult to rationalize. There are no clearly identifiable points of fundamental philosophical disagreement between the two camps, and the diversity within the mainstream is so considerable that some mainstream positions are closer to structuralist views than to other mainstream positions. Van Fraassen develops his constructive empiricism and introduces a structuralist version of the semantic view of theories based on the notion that target systems are isomorphic to an empirical substructure of a model of a theory.
Mainstream Core Texts

Mainstream Criticisms
The semantic approach has been criticized for a number of reasons. Intended as a response to Feyerabend, this book takes as its starting point Sneed's ideas about theory structure and theory change, reformulating some of them and further developing some others. Kuhn refers to this book when he remarks that the Sneed-Stegmuller formalism is the account of theories that best captures his own ideas.
Scientific Models
Models in science have attracted philosophical attention for a long time. Initially, this interest was driven by philosopher's interest in what was going on in the sciences. In many cases, scientists do not seem to aim to construct exact theories with a wide scope, but instead try to build models that represent the target systems in a simplified and idealized way. From the 1980s onwards, this literature also started engaging with the semantic view of theories, which many writers on models regard as something between unhelpful and misguided. Contains a discussion of models in scientific practice and offers one of the first taxonomies of models, which is based on the distinction between analogical, representational, theoretical, and imaginary models. Hesse offers an in-depth discussion of the use of analogical models, in the course of which she introduces the concepts of positive, negative, and neutral analogy, as well as the notion of formal analogy.
Early Work
Models in Scientific Practice
The 1980s saw an explosion of work on modeling, much of which emphasized the independence of models from theory. An influential collection of essays whose unifying theme is that models mediate between theory and the world. To do so, models have to be given the status of independent entitiesindependent of both theory and their target systems. Teller discusses what he calls the "Perfect Model Model," the view that the aim of science is to produce a perfect simile of nature, a perfect model. He criticizes this view as untenable and suggests an alternative that sees science as producing approximate and idealized models.
Models in the Special Sciences
An important aspect of the literature on models in this tradition is the focus on scientific practice.
Since practice is often discipline specific, a significant body of literature is dedicated to issues in This article argues that modeling in economics is characterized by an "explanation paradox":
(1) all models are false; (2) some economic models explain; (3) only true accounts explain.
Existing views of what economic models do are examined and rejected as inadequate responses to the paradox.
Wimsatt, William. Re-Engineering Philosophy for Limited Beings: Piecewise Approximations to
Reality. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2007. [ISBN: 9780674015456] In this book Wimsatt discusses a number of issues in the philosophy of biology, among them model building. He sees modeling as a self-correcting process in which false models serve as a means for the construction of correct theories. Godfrey-Smith provides a clear statement of what has become known as the "fiction view of models," the position that we ought to take at face value the fact that modelers often take themselves to be describing imaginary systems, and that these are best treated as similar to the imagined objects of literary fiction such as Tolkein's Middle-earth.
Models and Fiction
Many
Suárez, Mauricio, ed. Fictions in Science: Philosophical Essays on Modelling and Idealization.
London and New York: Routledge, 2009. [ISBN: 9780415990356] This collection brings together a number of essays that center around the idea the fictions are crucial to the practice of science. They explore the issue using both theoretical analysis and case studies, which are drawn from the empirical and mathematical sciences, including engineering.
Toon, Adam. Models as Make-Believe: Imagination, Fiction and Scientific Representation. Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012. [ISBN: 9780230301214] This book develops an approach to modeling by likening models to children's games of makebelieve. Drawing on philosophical discussions of art and fiction, Toon offers a unified framework to discuss the problems posed by modeling and at the same time help to make sense of scientific practice.
Material Models
Some models are material objects. Griesemer 1990 points out that material models are crucial in Sterrett analyzes the methodology of experimental scale modeling (also known as "physical similarity"). She studies the role of fundamental laws in the construction of experimental scale models. She points out that these models offer the opportunity to use observations on one piece of the world to make inferences about another piece of the world. In this paper, Toon applies his "make-believe" theory of modeling to an empirical study of molecular models. He analyzes users' interaction with molecular models as an imaginary activity, from which he derives a new account of how models are used to learn about the world.
Weisberg, Michael. Simulation and Similarity. New York: Oxford University Press, 2013.
[ ISBN: 9780199933662] Weisberg's book contains a discussion of a scale model of the San Francisco Bay: a large tank with the topography or the bay occupying an area of about 6,000 m 2 and a variety of hydraulic pumps allow engineers to simulate currents, tidal streams, and river flows in the bay. Weisberg analyzes this model using a similarity-based account of the model-world relationship.
Further Topics
Once models are recognized as independent entities, one can start asking a number of philosophical questions about them and direct one's attention to traditional philosophical issues from the perspective of a model-based approach. Four of these are singled out here as particularly interesting: representation, data, computer simulation, and idealization.
Models and Representation
How do models represent their target systems? The discussion can be divided into two strands: Giere argues that rather than focusing on the dyadic relationship between models and the world, we should focus on the pragmatic activity of representing, so that the basic representational relationship has the following form: scientists use models to represent aspects of the world for specific purposes. Reviews techniques of idealization that can be described as broadly "Galilean," namely those that involve deliberate simplifications-either by distortion or omission-of something 23 complicated, with a view to achieve at least a partial understanding of it, and critically examines their epistemic implications in the natural sciences. Discusses approximations involved in retrieving molecular orbital theory as used in chemistry from fundamental quantum mechanics. Woody observes that approximations are crucial and that full chemical theory cannot be retrieve by non-approximative ab initio calculations.
Models and Data
Data play an important role in modeling. Suppes points out that in processing raw data we construct a data model, and a number of authors see data models as the target system that 
